'Voyager' actors Ethan Phillips, Tim Russ, Garrett Wang, Robert Duncan McNeill, guest star Tom Wright, and writer Lisa Klink talked "Tuvix" at Trek Talks 3.
Tuvix is literally just a Trolley Problem scenario with a fancy costume. No more, no less. And the whole point of the trolley problem is that there isn’t any single “correct” answer.
There is an out of control trolley. You can’t stop it. On the trolley’s current track, there are two people. If you do nothing, they will die when the trolley hits them. But you’re at a track switch, and can divert the trolley to an alternate track. On that second track, there is one person who will die if the trolley hits them. Do you pull the lever? If you pull the lever, are you murdering the one? If you don’t pull the lever, are you complicit in the deaths of the two?
In this case, the trolley is the transporter accident; Janeway has the ability to pull the lever and reverse the accident. If she chooses not to, she is essentially refusing to pull the lever, thereby condemning the two people on the first track to die. But if she reverses the accident, she is pulling the lever and killing the one.
Janeway decided the answer to “should you pull the lever” was “yes”. She pulled the lever, saved the two, and killed the one. Sure, you could argue that pulling the lever is murdering the one. But if you sit by and do nothing, aren’t you willfully (maybe even maliciously) negligent? After all, you have the opportunity to save the lives of two, while minimizing damage to only one person.
Philosophers will try to change the trolley problem to fit different scenarios. What if it’s a bunch of convicted felons on the first track, and an innocent child on the second track? What if it’s a bunch of your friends and family on the first track, and your worst enemy on the second? What if, what if, what if… But the base question is always the same; Do you choose to do nothing and let many die, or actively kill the one? What is the tipping point where your decision changes?
Tuvix adds another element though. Tuvok and Neelix were already dead and Tuvix was alive. I think that makes this different from the standard trolley problem - still a hard choice but not the same.
IMO, once Neelix and Tuvok stop existing, they are dead. They have no consciousness, they aren’t around. They’re gone. They’re ex-people. They’re not sad about the situation, because they no longer exist. There’s no brain there to process any of this. Once you are dead, you don’t have a right to live, especially not if it means the death of another.
Tuvix, on the other hand, existed. He was conscious, self aware, intelligent, alive. He was dragged, crying, begging for his life, pleading for anybody to step in and stop him from being murdered. Then he was killed to bring two people back to life.
Now I know people will say “but 2 is more than 1, so it’s fine to kill him”, but that’s never sat right with me. What was that Picard speech about arithmetic not being a good reason for discarding the rights of sentient beings?
Tbh I’m astounded the Star Trek community is massively on the “murder of an innocent is ok if it saves more people and he’s a little ugly” side
Death is a moving line, even today. There’s a reason doctors don’t declare death until there’s no way to revive a patient. Using that same logic, if there’s a way to revive Neelix / Tuvox, are they dead? It’s going to come down to how you personally define death.
This is true but hard to argue within the universe as we just don’t have the info and there are in universe contradictions about transporters. Been a while since I saw the episode but for me - ‘nonexistentance’ is close enough to ‘dead’ that Tuvix should have been allowed to live.
I found it strange the claim started with the language “a Trolley Problem” and concluded with the language “the trolley problem”.
It seems one could make any choice into “a” trolley problem. But Tuvix problem is certainly not “the trolley problem”. This is about emergence of consciousness. In the trolley problem, the characters cease to exist. Neither choice here would end, say, Tuvok’s consciousness.
Neither choice here would end, say, Tuvok’s consciousness.
Arguable, since the result is neither Tuvok nor Neelix, but a new one based on those two. They’re not active, seperate consciousness stuffed into a Tuvixian body.
And unwinding Tuvix ends Tuvix’s consciousness. Neither Tuvok or Neelix keep Tuvix as part of themselves afterwards, he’d basically die if that was to happen.
Are you claiming it is in fact equivalent to the standard “trolley problem”? (I don’t think you are, but if you are, I’ll add)
If the point is even “arguable”, I claim that is enough to distinguish it from the trolley problem, because that argument doesn’t come up there.
That was my point. I agree that the consciousness that emerged is distinct from Tuvok (or of course Neelix, but I felt like an ass last time I used the “say Tuvok” construction).
Are you claiming it is in fact equivalent to the standard “trolley problem”? (I don’t think you are, but if you are, I’ll add)
Not exactly, was more thinking along the lines of both choices involving an end to the consciousness of one or the other. Either Tuvok and Neelix are held in limbo/non-existent from that point onwards, or Tuvix is unwound.
If the point is even “arguable”, I claim that is enough to distinguish it from the trolley problem, because that argument doesn’t come up there.
But I am curious, would it not? From my understanding, at the end of the shift, you’re still sacrificing one life to save two, or two to save one, which seems like it would harken back to the fundamentals of the issue. Assuming that no cloning or replicative shenanigans takes place, either Neelix/Tuvok are retained, or Tuvix is.
That said, there was some leeway in that Janeway had no urgent time-pressure to return them back to their bodies at the time, unlike with something like Transport-split Kirk. She mentions needing her crew back, but that could easily happen at some point in the future, and that might alter the variables of the problem, since part of the trolley problem is that there isn’t any time to take a third option, nor get help from other places.
Tuvix is literally just a Trolley Problem scenario with a fancy costume. No more, no less. And the whole point of the trolley problem is that there isn’t any single “correct” answer.
There is an out of control trolley. You can’t stop it. On the trolley’s current track, there are two people. If you do nothing, they will die when the trolley hits them. But you’re at a track switch, and can divert the trolley to an alternate track. On that second track, there is one person who will die if the trolley hits them. Do you pull the lever? If you pull the lever, are you murdering the one? If you don’t pull the lever, are you complicit in the deaths of the two?
In this case, the trolley is the transporter accident; Janeway has the ability to pull the lever and reverse the accident. If she chooses not to, she is essentially refusing to pull the lever, thereby condemning the two people on the first track to die. But if she reverses the accident, she is pulling the lever and killing the one.
Janeway decided the answer to “should you pull the lever” was “yes”. She pulled the lever, saved the two, and killed the one. Sure, you could argue that pulling the lever is murdering the one. But if you sit by and do nothing, aren’t you willfully (maybe even maliciously) negligent? After all, you have the opportunity to save the lives of two, while minimizing damage to only one person.
Philosophers will try to change the trolley problem to fit different scenarios. What if it’s a bunch of convicted felons on the first track, and an innocent child on the second track? What if it’s a bunch of your friends and family on the first track, and your worst enemy on the second? What if, what if, what if… But the base question is always the same; Do you choose to do nothing and let many die, or actively kill the one? What is the tipping point where your decision changes?
Tuvix adds another element though. Tuvok and Neelix were already dead and Tuvix was alive. I think that makes this different from the standard trolley problem - still a hard choice but not the same.
Yup. This is my problem with it.
IMO, once Neelix and Tuvok stop existing, they are dead. They have no consciousness, they aren’t around. They’re gone. They’re ex-people. They’re not sad about the situation, because they no longer exist. There’s no brain there to process any of this. Once you are dead, you don’t have a right to live, especially not if it means the death of another.
Tuvix, on the other hand, existed. He was conscious, self aware, intelligent, alive. He was dragged, crying, begging for his life, pleading for anybody to step in and stop him from being murdered. Then he was killed to bring two people back to life.
Now I know people will say “but 2 is more than 1, so it’s fine to kill him”, but that’s never sat right with me. What was that Picard speech about arithmetic not being a good reason for discarding the rights of sentient beings?
Tbh I’m astounded the Star Trek community is massively on the “murder of an innocent is ok if it saves more people and he’s a little ugly” side
Death is a moving line, even today. There’s a reason doctors don’t declare death until there’s no way to revive a patient. Using that same logic, if there’s a way to revive Neelix / Tuvox, are they dead? It’s going to come down to how you personally define death.
This is true but hard to argue within the universe as we just don’t have the info and there are in universe contradictions about transporters. Been a while since I saw the episode but for me - ‘nonexistentance’ is close enough to ‘dead’ that Tuvix should have been allowed to live.
I found it strange the claim started with the language “a Trolley Problem” and concluded with the language “the trolley problem”.
It seems one could make any choice into “a” trolley problem. But Tuvix problem is certainly not “the trolley problem”. This is about emergence of consciousness. In the trolley problem, the characters cease to exist. Neither choice here would end, say, Tuvok’s consciousness.
Arguable, since the result is neither Tuvok nor Neelix, but a new one based on those two. They’re not active, seperate consciousness stuffed into a Tuvixian body.
And unwinding Tuvix ends Tuvix’s consciousness. Neither Tuvok or Neelix keep Tuvix as part of themselves afterwards, he’d basically die if that was to happen.
Are you claiming it is in fact equivalent to the standard “trolley problem”? (I don’t think you are, but if you are, I’ll add)
If the point is even “arguable”, I claim that is enough to distinguish it from the trolley problem, because that argument doesn’t come up there.
That was my point. I agree that the consciousness that emerged is distinct from Tuvok (or of course Neelix, but I felt like an ass last time I used the “say Tuvok” construction).
Not exactly, was more thinking along the lines of both choices involving an end to the consciousness of one or the other. Either Tuvok and Neelix are held in limbo/non-existent from that point onwards, or Tuvix is unwound.
But I am curious, would it not? From my understanding, at the end of the shift, you’re still sacrificing one life to save two, or two to save one, which seems like it would harken back to the fundamentals of the issue. Assuming that no cloning or replicative shenanigans takes place, either Neelix/Tuvok are retained, or Tuvix is.
That said, there was some leeway in that Janeway had no urgent time-pressure to return them back to their bodies at the time, unlike with something like Transport-split Kirk. She mentions needing her crew back, but that could easily happen at some point in the future, and that might alter the variables of the problem, since part of the trolley problem is that there isn’t any time to take a third option, nor get help from other places.
Ahhh… I see. When I said “end”, I was thinking permanently, irreparably. Not just pause.
I like your plan of giving Tuvix a long and fulfilling life while the rest of the crew does fuck all lost in the delta quadrant.